Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or (stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative games, and importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, they can be mapped to a Stackelberg game. I.e., the game designer is the leader who is totally rational and honest, and the followers are mapped to the players of the designed game. If now the game designer, or "the leader" in the Stackelberg context, adopts a pure strategy, we postulate the following second part following from axiomatic observation of ultimate game leadership, where empirical insight leads to the second part of this postulate. Importantly, implementing a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, with a very honest and rational leader results in social optimality for all players (followers), assuming pure strategy across all followers and leader, and that the leader is totally rational, honest, and is able to achieve a minimum amount of competency in leading this game, with any finite number of iterations of leading this finite game.
John Nash stated the following theoremfor non-cooperative games that became widely known as the Nash equilibrium:, Theorem 1 (Nash Equilibrium) Every game with a finite number of players and action profiles has at least one Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1951] . A mixed 1 strategy always has an equilibrium.
2 [Nash, 1951] .
We have discovered a postulate as a counter-point to the Nash-Equilibrium Theorem 1 above. Our postulate is: * NICTA is funded by the Australian Government through the Department of Communications and the Australian Research Council through the ICT Centre of Excellence Program.
1 Mixed implies non-deterministic 2 i.e., a best response to all others' best responses, which is not guaranteed for a completely deterministic, or pure, strategy. Expanding on Postulate 1, there are a finite to an infinite number of players which have pure strategies. Due to the players having pure strategies, the Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed, as stated in Theorem 1. But, however, we have an empirical observation from a test-case of "global" Stackelberg game design in transmit radio power control for multiple wireless body area network (BANs) coexistence, where a hierarchical equilibrium is ensured by the followers and this was then iterated by the principal game designer to achieve a socially optimal outcome for the BAN coexistence, despite that all previous theory suggested that this was not possible for any wireless communications network with power control based on a non-cooperative game [Dong et al., 2015] . I.e., in a behavioral science context of the game designer, principally J. Dong, providing competent and intelligent leadership for the followers game of distributed transmit power control with no central coordination, then social optimality was postulated empirically from results of implementation.
To obtain Postulate 1, a series of papers were used as tools to solve this property. The first paper which sparked this postulate was a non-cooperative transmit power control game [Smith et al., 2014a] , which obtained Pareto-efficient outcomes such as minimized transmit power and rapid convergence to target packet delivery ratios (PDRs). Next, [Smith et al., 2014a] was simplified for a standard proposal to the IEEE 802.15 task group 8 [Smith et al., 2014b] , which is currently being considered for the draft 802.15.8 specification . The utility function from [Smith et al., 2014a] was modified such that it had strict concavity in [Dong et al., 2015] and under all conditions guaranteed a unique Nash equilibrium. In [Tushar et al., 2012] , a Stackelberg game was proposed, showing that infinite number of players can potentially be mapped into four-playing group types . Finally it can be inferred from [Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2014] , crucially to behavioral sciences, that followers could potentially mapped into four levels of rationality in games , which if maintained with properly initiated pure strategy action profiles from the game leader, then We postulate, that in the general case, social optimality is still achievable. This is considering a limit of four possible categories of game-theoretic behavior: (0) Totally Irrational [Wright and Leyton-Brown, 2014] ; (1) More irrational than rational (i.e., somewhat irrational); (2) More rational than irrational (i.e., Somewhat rational) and (3) Totally rational; that encapsulates all possible game behaviors for non-rational games.
